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Abstract: This paper examines the signifi cance of the Supreme Court’s Hendricks 
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conceptualize the notion of volitional impairment. The Hendricks decision autho-
rized postsentence civil commitment for sex offenders having a mental abnormal-
ity or personality disorder, rendering them likely to engage in future acts of sexu-
al violence. In the Supreme Court’s majority opinion, Justice Thomas implied that 
the Kansas Act was legitimized by limiting the class of offenders eligible for this 
specialized form of commitment to those who are “unable to control” their danger-
ousness. In Crane, the Court ruled that while the Hendricks decision does not re-
quire that a sex offender be completely unable to control behavior, it does require 
proof of serious diffi culty in controlling conduct. In evaluating the meaning of this 
decision for mental health professionals, this paper notes the decline of volitional 
impairment standards in the insanity defense, summarizes case law regarding sexu-
al predators and volitional impairment, and further reviews the empirical and theo-
retical literatures exploring the notion of volitional impairment. 
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1. Kansas v. Hendricks 
In Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), the United States Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, up-
held a Kansas law establishing procedures for the indefi nite civil commitment of persons 
found to have a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder,” rendering them likely to en-
gage in “predatory acts of sexual violence.” This decision, allowing indeterminate civil com-
mitment for certain sex offenders after completion of a prison sentence, is refl ective of one 
of society’s most recent attempts to protect the public by preventing repeat occurrences of 
these particularly chilling (as Justice Thomas, author of the majority opinion, referred to the 
behavior in Hendricks) sexually deviant offenses. 
In 1994, the Kansas legislature enacted a comprehensive scheme for the commitment of 
sexually violent predators due to their “likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sex-
ual violence” (In re Hendricks, 1996). This Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act was mod-
eled after legislation enacted in Washington in 1990, which was similarly devised to deal with 
the problem of repeat sex offenders. The State of Kansas sought to use its SVP Act for the fi rst 
time on Leroy Hendricks, a prisoner with an extensive history of sexually assaultive behavior. 
Undoubtedly, Hendricks’ nearly 40-year history of sexual misconduct was precisely the 
type that lawmakers wanted to control. In 1994, at the time the civil commitment petition 
was fi led, Hendricks had served 10 years of his 5- to 20-year sentence and was scheduled to 
be released to a halfway house (In re Hendricks, 1996). At trial, Hendricks acknowledged 
that he is a pedophile and testifi ed to the fact that when he gets stressed out, he is unable to 
control the urge to sexually molest children (In re Hendricks, 1996). Moreover, despite a 
verbalized realization that his deviant acts are harmful to children, and his professed hope 
not to commit further assaults, he remarked that the only way to ensure that he would not re-
assault was “to die” (In re Hendricks, 1996). 
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Under the Kansas statute, civil commitment requires that the state demonstrate that the 
sexual offender suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder and that this dis-
order renders the offender likely to commit sexual offenses (K.S.A. §59-29a02, 1994). At 
trial, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks qualifi ed as a SVP, based 
upon the facts that Hendricks “suffers from pedophilia” and “continues to harbor sexual 
desires toward children,” which he admittedly cannot control when “stressed out” (Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 1997). 
1.1. Inability to control in Hendricks 
In Hendricks (1997), the majority seemed to view the inability to control behavior as 
a particular form of mental abnormality that legitimized Hendricks’ commitment. Justice 
Thomas, who delivered the opinion of the Court, mentioned specifi cally that a fi nding of vo-
litional impairment serves to limit involuntary civil commitment “in that it narrows the class 
of persons eligible for confi nement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness” 
(Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997). Indeed, throughout the majority opinion, Justice Thomas re-
peatedly referred to the notion of volitional impairment, noting that “[t]his admitted lack of 
volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness adequately distinguish-
es Hendricks from other dangerous individuals who are more properly dealt with exclusively 
through the criminal justice system” (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997). 
Unfortunately, nowhere in the opinion did the Court choose to elucidate what is meant by 
this vague notion of volitional impairment. Instead, the Court appeared to rely largely upon 
Hendricks’ own testimony (concerning loss of control when under stress) and prior criminal 
history (including repeated acts of sexual violence) to support the conclusion that he suffered 
such volitional impairment. That the Court relied on Hendricks’ history of sexual deviance 
and proclamations is at best mere speculation, as nowhere in the record is there explicit note 
concerning why Hendricks is viewed as suffering a volitional impairment. 
If the Court is relying, in part, upon Hendricks’ history, there remains a paucity of in-
formation relevant to how the inability to control is anything more than criminal recidi-
vism. Schopp (1998) comments that the fact that some individuals choose to act repeat-
edly upon aberrant desires provides no evidence of volitional impairment. Indeed, if mere 
history of sexual misconduct provides evidence of volitional impairment, we have no way 
of differentiating those offenders with bona fi de loss of control from those who simply 
choose to violate social rules by repeatedly acting upon their criminal desires (Schopp, 
1998). 
Moreover, relying on Hendricks’ own statements might be of questionable validity and 
reliability. Morse (1998) argues that subjective feelings of loss of control are not suffi cient 
to establish that one is, in fact, out of control. Such subjective report, with the potential to be 
minimized or exaggerated to satisfy a legal threshold, is not a reliable or valid way to mea-
sure control problems (Morse, 1998). Because we are without a defi nition of the notion of 
volitional impairment, it is impossible to know for certain what criteria the court considered 
in fi nding that Hendricks was not in control of his actions. 
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2. Kansas v. Crane 
The Supreme Court clarifi ed the unanswered question of whether Hendricks required vo-
litional impairment in Kansas v. Crane (2002). In recognizing the impractical nature of an 
absolutist approach, Crane (2002) held that something less than an absolute lack of control 
is required. While the Court did not provide a precise description of what might qualify as 
something less than an absolute lack of control, they did note that those eligible for commit-
ment will generally fi nd it “particularly diffi cult to control their behavior” (WL 75609 at 5). 
Crane, a repeat sex offender, was diagnosed with both pedophilia and antisocial person-
ality disorder (Crane, 2002). At the commitment proceeding, Dr. Mabugat, a psychiatrist, 
gave opinion that Crane’s behavior “was a combination of willful and uncontrollable behav-
ior” (In re Crane, 2000, 7 P.3d at 290). While the record notes that Dr. Mabugat’s testimo-
ny provides “evidence of some inability on Crane’s part to control his behavior,” the court 
opinion does not provide evidence for such explanation. Indeed, the opinion does not speci-
fy or provide description for the parts of his behavior that were uncontrollable nor does it ex-
plain the apparent contradiction that Crane’s behavior was both willful and uncontrollable 
(In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 290). Nor does the opinion provide rationale for the State’s experts 
fi nding that Crane’s mental impairment “does not impair his volitional control to the degree 
he cannot control his dangerous behavior (In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 288). Thus, we are left with-
out some reasonable understanding of what this notion means. Michael Crane, unlike Le-
roy Hendricks, did not claim to have volitional impairment. Like Hendricks, however, Crane 
also has a history of sexually deviant behavior. 
Whether either of these factors helped to support the notion of some uncontrollable be-
havior is unclear, as the court opinion does not offer clear explanation of the basis of the ex-
perts’ decisions nor describe how the pathology manifested by Crane affected his ability to 
control his conduct. 
Indeed, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas in the dissenting opinion of Crane 
(2002), notes that the Court’s lack of elaboration about the specifi c circumstances affecting 
volitional impairment leaves trial courts without direction as to how they are to charge the 
jury. The opinion notes that the Court most likely failed to elaborate because there simply is 
no satisfactory way to frame the notion of inability to control, adding that “to leave the law 
in such a state of utter indeterminancy” is clearly irresponsible. 
3. The rise of SVP legislation 
Earl Shriner, a repeat sex offender who raped and cut off the penis of a 7-year-old boy upon 
his prison release, prompted the State of Washington to take action to ensure that such offend-
ers be effectively managed. In 1990, the Washington legislature established the Communi-
ty Protection Act, which, along with increased penalties and required registration for sex of-
fenders, included a new law for a specialized form of sex offender civil commitment (Ameri-
can Psychological Association [APA], 1999). While most civil commitment statutes authorize 
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civil commitment as an alternative to sanction through the criminal justice system, the sexu-
al predator statutes allow commitment at the end of the offender’s prison term on the basis of 
prior criminal acts. Indeed, such legislation is targeted at individuals whose tendency to com-
mit sexual offense has not diminished during the period that the offender was confi ned. 
The Washington Sexually Violent Predator Statute, upheld by the Supreme Court of 
Washington (In re Young, 1993), has served as the prototype for numerous other recent-
ly enacted sex offender statutes. Typically, these laws include four elements: (1) a histo-
ry of sexual violence, (2) a current mental disorder or “abnormality,” (3) risk of future sex 
crimes, and (4) some form of connection between the mental disorder and the danger, such 
that the mental impairment predisposes the individual to future sexual violence or “makes” 
it likely that the future harm will occur (Janus, 2000). To date, over 15 states have adopt-
ed some variation of the Washington sexual predator law, allowing indeterminate commit-
ment after completion of the prison term on the basis of future dangerousness. 
These laws can also be differentiated from general civil commitment statutes on the 
basis of the overt act requirement. Ordinary civil commitment, for example, might be jus-
tifi ed where there has been some evidence of decline in the offender’s psychological ca-
pacities, indicating increased dangerousness during the period of the offender’s confi ne-
ment (Schopp, Scalora, & Pearce, 1999). Under the newer statutes, there is no require-
ment that a sex offender has committed a recent overt act to initiate civil commitment 
proceedings. Quite the contrary, sexual predator statutes provide for commitment based 
partly on prior criminal acts without any evidence of increased dangerousness or height-
ened proclivity to commit sexual offenses (Schopp et al., 1999). Moreover, ordinary civ-
il commitment generally requires proof of serious mental disorder (La Fond, 2000). The 
sexual predator statutes have been subject to criticism, as they allow civil commitment 
without the “serious impairment of orientation, consciousness, comprehension, reason-
ing, or reality testing” that ordinarily is necessary to support civil commitment (Schopp 
et al., 1999). For example, Dr. Charles Befort, a testifying psychologist in Hendricks, of-
fered that Hendricks qualifi ed for diagnoses of “personality trait disturbance, passive–
aggressive personality, and pedophilia,” types of impairment that generally fall below 
the threshold to support the mental illness requirement of civil commitment statutes. Al-
though a DSM-IV diagnosis is, in and of itself, never suffi cient to support commitment, 
the types of disorders more likely to render one eligible for civil commitment are those 
that involve more severe impairment, such as schizophrenia or mental retardation. 
4. Purpose of paper 
Pratt (2000) suggests that sex offenders are being “pursued and punished with even more 
vigor than in the sexual psychopath era” (p. 143). Certainly, this specialized form of commit-
ment seems to have widened the civil commitment net by increasing the number of sex of-
fenders eligible for civil commitment. While the public may feel reassured in its safety, these 
laws have not been without controversy. The Hendricks majority rejected Hendricks’ double 
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jeopardy and ex post facto challenges, noting that the Kansas Act is civil, and not punitive, 
in nature (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997). Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent in Hendricks, 
argued, however, that Hendricks’ confi nement is a violation of double jeopardy, noting that 
“it was not simply an effort to commit Hendricks civilly, but rather to infl ict further punish-
ment upon him.” Justice Breyer further maintained that constitutional provisions against ex 
post facto law making prohibited the statute’s application to Hendricks, who was already in 
prison when the law was enacted. Later cases have continued to challenge the law’s constitu-
tionality based upon procedural and substantive due process claims. For example, in Seling, 
the Supreme Court, in ruling that Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Statute was civ-
il rather than criminal, precluded petitioner Andre Brigham Young’s double jeopardy and ex 
post facto challenges (Seling v. Young, 2001; see, also, In re Linehan, 1999). 
Because this paper seeks to examine facets of the law already in place rather than focus-
ing on a constitutional analysis of whether the law should in fact be in place, a detailed re-
view will not be given to analysis of ex post facto, double jeopardy, and substantive due 
process claims at issue in recent cases. Nor will focus be given to the implications of the 
widened civil commitment net, ostensibly resulting from the expanded types of mental im-
pairment (e.g., antisocial conduct establishing a personality disorder) supporting involuntary 
commitment along with the lack of traditional overt act requirements (see La Fond, 2000). 
This paper will explore the notion of volitional impairment in an attempt to provide mental 
health professionals with a more complete understanding of the notion, through both an ex-
amination of its legal history as well as through an examination of multidisciplinary concep-
tualizations. Because there is no widely accepted or court offered conceptualization, this pa-
per seeks not to provide a single uniform explanation but rather to inform clinicians as to the 
complexities involved in evaluating evidence of volitional impairment. 
5. Relevance to clinicians 
What, if any, relevance does the Supreme Court’s holdings in Hendricks and Crane have 
for mental health professionals?1 For one, clinicians regularly provide expert testimony or re-
port in hearings held to determine whether offenders meet civil commitment criteria (Schopp 
et al., 1999). In regard to the determinative criteria mentioned above, mental health profes-
sionals might be asked to provide information relevant to whether the subject of a commit-
ment hearing has a mental abnormality or personality disorder, rendering him likely to com-
mit a sexual offense. Moreover, they might be asked to provide clinical opinion relevant 
to an offender’s volitional capacity. Certainly, with specifi ed legal criteria provided by the 
courts, clinicians could communicate knowledge about observed personality characteristics 
or symptom patterns in a way that would assist the trier of fact in answering questions con-
cerning whether Hendricks criteria are met. 
1 The terms “mental health professionals” and “clinicians” will be used interchangeably to refer to those psy-
chologists, psychiatrists, or related professionals who routinely provide testimony or report to the court. 
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Ordinarily, when an individual convicted of a sex crime is set to be released from prison, 
the state may fi le a petition claiming that such individual is a violent sexual predator (Seling 
v. Young, 2001). That fi ling initiates a process for determining whether a sex offender qual-
ifi es as an SVP, under a particular state’s defi nition. The offender is typically provided with 
a probable cause hearing, counsel, experts, and the option of trial by judge or jury (Seling v. 
Young, 2001). 
In Kansas, for example, a judge determines, during a hearing in which the offender is en-
titled to representation by counsel, whether probable cause exists to believe that the offend-
er is an SVP (K.S.A. §59-29a05, 1994). If such a determination is made during the proba-
ble cause hearing, the alleged predator is transferred to a secure facility where a profession-
al evaluation is completed (K.S.A. §59-29a05, 1994). Within 60 days following the proba-
ble cause hearing, a trial is conducted (K.S.A. §59-29a06, 1994). The individual, as well as 
the judge or attorney general, has a right to demand a jury trial. The individual may also re-
tain, at the court’s expense if necessary, a qualifi ed expert or professional to conduct an eval-
uation (K.S.A. §59-29a06, 1994). 
As referenced above, mental health testimony and/or report are infl uential, and often inte-
gral, components of the process of civilly committing a sex offender. Despite the heavy reli-
ance on expert evidence, ultimately, the judge or jury determines whether the offender is el-
igible for postsentence civil commitment. While a clinician may, for example, function as a 
consultant to a court by providing expert testimony concerning an offender’s observed irra-
tional thought processes or behavioral impulsivity, clinicians have typically been dissuad-
ed from addressing the ultimate question of whether an offender qualifi es for a particular le-
gal status (see Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997). Under the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence and in jurisdictions adhering to a similar standard, clinicians are barred from offer-
ing conclusory opinions regarding mental state or condition, where it constitutes an element 
of the crime charged or of a defense thereto (Melton et al., 1997). As mentioned above, how-
ever, not only is such testimony often expressly proscribed, but with regard to volitional im-
pairment in particular, a clinician would not have any indication of what to base such testi-
mony upon without direction from the court as to how it is defi ning volitional impairment. 
Moreover, it is well established both in case law and the mental health literature that clin-
ical and legal meanings of mental illness are not synonymous. The use of diagnostic labels 
for legal purposes has been criticized on the grounds that they are descriptively imprecise 
(Slobogin, Melton, & Showalter, 1984). Although potentially helpful in determining whether 
a pattern of behavior meets a legal threshold, diagnostic labels should not be considered dis-
positive of a legal issue (Slobogin et al., 1984). For example, in McDonald v. United States 
(1962), the D.C. Court of Appeals noted, “What psychiatrists may consider a ‘mental dis-
ease or defect’ for clinical purposes, where their concern is treatment, may or may not be 
the same as mental disease or defect for the jury’s purpose” (see, also, Washington v. Unit-
ed States, 1967). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edi-
tion (DSM-IV; APA, 1994), explicitly states that the inclusion of diagnostic categories, such 
as pedophilia, does not imply that the conduct meets legal criteria for what constitutes men-
tal disease and states further that these categorizations “may not be wholly relevant to legal 
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judgments.” Schopp and Sturgis (1995) differentiate between mental illness, as recognized 
in the mental health and legal arenas, noting that mental illness in the mental health are-
na generally refers to an impairment in psychological processes, which may correspond to 
a formal diagnostic category, while mental illness in the legal arena is a mental impairment 
rendering one ineligible for a particular legal status and the rights or liabilities commensu-
rate with that status. 
While stated clearly in the case law, diagnostic manuals, and professional literature, ex-
perts often have more diffi culty limiting their role when involved in the evidentiary process. 
Indeed, Schopp and Quattrocchi (1995) note the responsibilities not only of clinicians in lim-
iting their testimony but also of the attorneys in asking such questions to experts and of judg-
es in allowing such questions and/or responses. 
This is not to say, however, that there is no role for mental health professionals in the pro-
cess. Quite the opposite, the training and experience of clinicians provides them with spe-
cialized knowledge that can assist courts in making the normative judgments as to whether 
particular legal criteria are met. Clinicians can offer descriptive and explanatory testimony 
relevant to an offender’s impairment, and the relationship between that impairment and the 
criminal conduct at issue (Schopp & Sturgis, 1995). Undoubtedly, there is utility to clinical 
expertise when it provides thorough description of clinicians’ unique understanding of hu-
man behavior. The court then makes the normative judgment as to whether such impairment, 
as described by the mental health professional, renders the individual eligible (or ineligible) 
for a particular legal status (Schopp & Sturgis, 1995). Undeniably, the application of the rel-
evant legal criteria has the potential of being aided by the specialized knowledge of mental 
health professionals (Bonnie, 1984). 
5.1. A brief history of the insanity defense and volitional impairment 
Given that courts have long struggled with defi ning volitional impairment in the insan-
ity context, a brief history of the struggle in this alternative mental health domain deserves 
mention. Since the earliest codifi cation of a criminal responsibility standard in M’Naghten 
(M’Naghten’s Case, 1843), courts have grappled with attempts to formulate meaningful in-
sanity standards. The M’Naghten test was purely cognitive, focusing solely on whether the 
defendant had knowledge of the nature and quality of the criminal act and whether he knew 
that act was wrong (Melton et al., 1997). Criticizing the M’Naghten test as too narrow, an 
“irresistible impulse” rule was formed, which broadened the standard to include severe voli-
tional impairment in individuals who were otherwise aware of the wrongfulness of their ac-
tions (Parsons v. State, 1886). However, this test also met resistance, as it required total cog-
nitive or volitional incapacity, in an era where such absolutist views were considered increas-
ingly outdated and irrelevant (Ogloff, Roberts, & Roesch, 1993). More importantly, distin-
guishing between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted proved to be exceeding-
ly diffi cult (Rogers & Shuman, 2000). 
In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) published its Model Penal Code, in which 
a new insanity defense standard was drafted. The ALI formulation included both volition-
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al and cognitive components: “A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time 
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law” (Melton et al., 1997, p.192). The term “substantial capacity” seemed to allow some-
thing less than total cognitive or volitional impairment. Although once widely popular in a 
majority of U.S. jurisdictions, this standard fell into public disfavor after John Hinckley, who 
attempted to assassinate President Reagan, was found not guilty by reason of insanity under 
it (Ogloff et al., 1993). The Hinckley acquittal fueled a growing controversy regarding the 
volitional prong of the ALI. Indeed, both the American Bar Association (ABA; 1983) and 
the APA (1983) advocated for the abolition of the volitional prong, asserting that less consis-
tent application of the insanity defense would result from utilizing such an imprecise stan-
dard (Melton et al., 1997). Quite aptly, the APA issued the following statement: 
The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharp-
er than that between twilight and dusk. . .The concept of volition is the subject of some 
disagreement among psychiatrists. Many psychiatrists therefore believe that psychiatric 
testimony (particularly that of a conclusory nature) about volition is more likely to pro-
duce confusion for jurors than is psychiatric testimony relevant to a defendant’s apprecia-
tion or understanding (p. 685). 
The ABA (1983) similarly criticized volitional tests by noting that there is still no val-
id or reliable basis for measuring capacity for or impairment of self-control. Prior to be-
coming a Supreme Court Justice, Warren Burger commented that the irresistible impulse 
label has “always been a misleading concept because it has connotations of some sudden 
outburst of impulse and completely overlooks the fact that people do a lot of weird and 
strange and unlawful things as a result of not just sudden impulse but long brooding and 
disturbed emotional makeup” (Melton et al., 1997, p. 201). As a result of these and other 
criticisms, the ALI formulation gradually began to fall out of use, with more states return-
ing to some variation of the strictly cognitive M’Naghten test (Melton et al., 1997). 
Indeed, the lack of objective criteria on which to make a judgment regarding whether an 
impulse is truly irresistible or simply not resisted has been troubling (Melton et al., 1997). 
Bonnie (1984) argues that volitional clauses increase psychiatric disagreement and error as 
there is “no way to calibrate the degree of impairment of behavior controls” (p. 17). In-
deed, Bonnie suggests that because we do not have objective methodology for determining 
volitional impairment, litigation is often reduced to subjective moral guesses. Melton et al. 
(1997), in their seminal text, sum up the discussion of the volitional prong in the insanity de-
fense by noting that its scope is “extremely vague” (p. 201). Notably, the argument that we 
are not able to measure volitional impairment accurately is at the heart of much of this criti-
cism (e.g., ABA, 1983; Bonnie, 1984). What is often ignored, however, is a defi nition of vo-
litional impairment. Undeniably, to calibrate a measure of volitional impairment would fi rst 
require operationalization of the notion of self-control. Nevertheless, it is curious that the 
Supreme Court would require volitional impairment in Crane, given the widespread criti-
cism of volitional impairment prongs in the insanity context. 
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6. Attempts to defi ne volitional control 
6.1. Case law 
In 1994, Minnesota adopted a “sexual psychopathic personality” law, recodifi ed from a 
1939 “psychopathic personality” law (Minn. Stat. §253B.02, subd. 18b [Supp. 1997]). The 
Legislature defi ned a sexually dangerous person as one who evidences a habitual course of 
misconduct in sexual matters and an utter lack of power to control sexual impulses, which 
makes that person a danger to others (Minn. Stat. §253B.02, subd. 18b [Supp. 1997]). Min-
nesota, through recent cases, has brought some clarity to the idea of lack of volitional con-
trol. In In re Patterson (1995), the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected a literal interpreta-
tion of lack of volitional control offered by a psychologist who “limited his defi nition of lack 
of control only to those very extreme examples of persons who had cognitive defi cits aris-
ing from conditions such as severe mental retardation, dementia, or organic brain damage.” 
Similarly, in In re Kunshier (1995) the court rejected the premise that evidence for loss of 
control be limited to only “those individuals who suffer conditions such as psychosis, sleep 
walking, or brain seizures.” 
Under Minnesota law, planning or grooming behavior (i.e., conduct intended to select and 
prepare potential victims) by a sexual offender does not necessarily preclude a fi nding of ut-
ter lack of power to control sexual impulses (Held, 1999). While the Linehan I (1994) and In 
re Schweninger (1994) courts considered evidence of planning and grooming to be inconsis-
tent with a fi nding of lack of volitional control, other Minnesota courts have found the utter 
lack of power to control standard to be met, even where an offender had engaged in groom-
ing (In re Bieganowski, 1994; In re Adolphson, 1995), where the offender’s acts were char-
acterized by a “fair amount of planning and deliberateness” (In re Pirkl, 1995) and where the 
offender’s actions were “deliberate to some degree” (In re Mayfi eld, 1995). 
Several Minnesota decisions have also revealed that an offender’s lack of insight may be 
relevant to a fi nding of lack of volitional control. In re Irwin (1995) noted that “without this 
basic insight [into his problem], appellant has the utter lack of control.” In In re Adolphson 
(1995), the court found that the offender met the utter lack of power to control standard due 
to his “entrenched belief” in the acceptability of sexual activity with minors. 
Related decisions have clarifi ed that constant or total lack of control is not necessary. 
Rather, loss of control might be situational (In re Pirkl, 1995; In re Mattson, 1995) and may 
predictably result from the removal of external controls (In re Toulou, 1994). Moreover, an 
offender need not exhibit lack of control all the time (In re Irwin, 1995; In re Toulou, 1994). 
Repeated misconduct despite negative consequences might be relevant to the understand-
ing of inability to control (Held, 1999). In In re Kunshier (1995), the court gave considerable 
weight to evidence showing that the offender’s “impulses override any normal fear of cap-
ture or consequences,” in fi nding that the offender was dependent upon incarceration to con-
trol his sexual impulses. Another court (In re Mattson, 1995) noted that “when a person en-
gages in behavior despite repeated consequences, it evidences a lack of control.” Moreover, 
the In re Crocker (1997), the court considered as evidence of lack of control the fact that an 
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offender engaged in criminal behavior even when it was very foreseeable that he would be 
caught. In People v. Martinez (2001), in determining that a repeat rapist qualifi ed as an SVP, 
a California Appellate Court gave weight to the psychologist’s assertion, “when you engage 
in these kinds of crimes and you’re in custody for another rape, one wonders if you are at all 
able to exert any control over sexual deviant fantasies and urges,” despite that the defense’s 
expert witness found no evidence that the defendant was volitionally impaired, noting that 
the defendant “knew what he wanted and intentionally acted to get it.” 
Unpredictability has also been considered relevant to volitional impairment. In the con-
curring opinion of Westerheide v. Florida (2000), it was suggested that acts of free choice 
would likely be unpredictable, while avolitional acts (by reason of mental abnormality or 
personality disorder) would be more predictable, if based upon diagnostic criteria proved to 
be reliable and valid. 
Unfortunately, where defi nition has been given regarding volitional impairment, the def-
inition has been vague. In Westerheide v. Florida (2000), the court defi ned volitional for the 
purpose of an SVP hearing to mean an “act of will or choosing the act of deciding or the ex-
ercise of will.” No satisfactory legal defi nition exists, however, that precisely articulates the 
kinds of impairment or psychological dysfunction that qualify as volitional impairment. 
While these cases give some indication of what may be relevant to an inability to control 
standard (e.g., repeated misconduct despite consequences, lack of insight, predictability) as 
well as what is not necessarily required for volitional impairment (e.g., total or constant vo-
litional impairment, “true” volitional impairment, such as seizure disorder), the information 
provided is generally less than satisfactory. Not only is there no clear articulation of what 
qualifi es as inability to control, but also, court opinions often seem contradictory in nature 
(e.g., evidence of planning or grooming behavior). In sum, analysis of these cases reveals lit-
tle about what is meant by the notion of volitional impairment and may serve only to confuse 
the courts or mental health experts further. 
6.2. Legal theory 
Volitional control, often as it relates to the insanity defense, has been the subject of much 
discourse in the legal arena. Schopp (1991) offered two interpretations of the idea behind vo-
litional control standards. In the literal interpretation, an individual lacks control over his 
or her behavior if that person is literally unable to direct movement (or lack of movement) 
through decision (Pelayo, 1999). Such inability might occur through epilepsy, stroke, or oth-
er neurological impairment. For example, while skiing, a person might suffer a stroke caus-
ing temporary paralysis in his legs. While this skier may observe persons in his path and be 
consciously aware that he is running over them, his decision process is unable to control his 
legs so as to avoid hitting another skier. 
In a more fl exible interpretation of volitional standards, Schopp (1991) considers that there 
are degrees to which behavior is controlled. Under this fl exible standard, an offender may lack 
control over his behavior when it would be unreasonable to expect him to perform (or not per-
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form) a certain act under his or her particular circumstances (Schopp, 1991). While this expla-
nation of a more fl exible standard helps to provide some insight into the importance of circum-
stance and may be the type of volitional impairment that the Crane Court is referring to, we 
still lack a clear and shared understanding of the types of circumstances under which it would 
be unreasonable to expect a sex offender to exert control over sexually deviant conduct. 
Morse (1994), in commenting on the complicated nature of “control” excuses, identifi ed 
several self-protective variables that he described as helping one exercise control over one’s 
actions. These include self-awareness/self-monitoring, fear of consequences, rationality (in-
cluding accurate perception and appropriate reasoning), desire for moral behavior, control 
over emotions, capacity for empathy, self-control (i.e., ability to suppress desires), and fi -
nally, good judgment or practical wisdom. Morse urges that when determining blame (or 
lack thereof) for wrongdoing, it is helpful to consider the degree to which a person possesses 
these self-protective variables. 
Morse (1994) further recommends that in making normative decisions concerning a 
person’s blameworthiness, the fact fi nder should consider that the possession of these self-
protective variables is “mostly a function of hereditary and environmental factors during 
childhood and adolescence that were not determined by the agent” (p. 1609). While not 
suggesting that we use these variables to excuse behavior, Morse does suggest that we 
consider these factors when making judgments, as it will give us a sense of how diffi cult it 
was (or was not) for this person to “fl y straight” (p. 1610). 
Rachlin, Halpern, and Portnow (1984), “with a certain amount of hubris,” sought to un-
dertake the challenge of differentiating between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not re-
sisted. Their framework for distinguishing these acts came in response to the APA statement 
referred to above (regarding the line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not re-
sisted, being no sharper than that between twilight and dusk). Individuals unable to resist an 
impulse must act to alleviate “otherwise overwhelming anxiety” (Rachlin et al., 1984). They 
are viewed as overcontrolled obsessive-compulsive individuals whose impulses are general-
ly ego-dystonic, unwanted, intrusive, and/or irrational. Indeed, Rachlin et al. stress that it is 
the futility or absurdity of the rituals (often checking, cleaning, avoiding, or repeating) that is 
a “critical diagnostic element.” Alternatively, those individuals who are able to resist impuls-
es, but choose otherwise, are viewed as generally immature and are unlikely to enter treat-
ment voluntarily (unlike their counterparts who are likely to be treatment seeking). The ac-
tion engaged in is typically ego-syntonic and pleasurable. Moreover, the purpose is typically 
clear, as the individual benefi ts somehow from the behavior. 
While this defi nition refl ects, to some degree, the distinction between the DSM-IV (APA, 
1994) impulse control and obsessive-compulsive disorders, it is not readily apparent that this 
distinction would assist in the determination of an offender’s ability or inability to control 
conduct, as articulated by the Hendricks Court. It is also not clear why this interpretation of 
inability to control would justify either exculpation under an insanity defense or commit-
ment under sexual predator statutes. Indeed, with regard to the sexual predator legislation, 
the justifi catory signifi cance of using this interpretation to distinguish those appropriate for 
commitment from those more appropriately dealt with through criminal justice proceedings 
is unclear. Finally, the reference to overwhelming anxiety suggests that the authors may have 
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simply relocated the question. That is, if “overwhelming” means that which the individual is 
unable to control or resist, the interpretation is vacuous because it merely rephrases the ques-
tion. Moreover, with regard to the nature of the impulses, it is worth noting that some pedo-
philes experience both pleasure from the sexually abusive act and from the ego-dystonic re-
morse following the act, sometimes enough to seek treatment in the absence of criminal jus-
tice system involvement. The authors, of course, acknowledge that theirs is a theoretical de-
lineation, which may or may not have relevance to legal questions. 
The discussion of Schopp (1991) of volitional impairment refl ects the varied legal theo-
ries about this notion. On the one hand, some theorists appear to employ a literal interpre-
tation of volitional impairment, including only those acts that are not willed muscular con-
tractions (see, e.g., Pelayo, 1999). On the other hand, some theorists appear to utilize a fl ex-
ible interpretation of volitional impairment (e.g., Morse, 1994; Rachlin et al., 1984), consid-
ering factors, such as certain self-protective variables, anxiety, or the extent to which impuls-
es are unwanted, as central to the notion of volitional impairment. In sum, legal theorists ap-
pear less than consistent in discussing volitional impairment. Some conceptualize the notion 
in the pure sense, focusing on the ability to direct movement through decision. Others seem 
to conceptualize something less than true volitional impairment, recognizing that there are 
certain factors or circumstances that may help or hinder one from controlling conduct. 
6.3. Psychological/criminological theory 
One of the most infl uential crime theories to date is that of Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990), who argue that the lack of self-control is the broadest and most important cause of 
crime (Baumeister & Boden, 1998). The central idea behind Gottfredson and Hirschi’s gen-
eral theory of crime is that a defi cit in self-control, which is theorized to be an inborn trait, 
whose manifestation relates to ineffective child rearing, increases the propensity of individu-
als to commit crime. The authors posit that persons lacking in self-control “tend to be impul-
sive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted, and nonverbal, 
and they will tend therefore to engage in criminal and analogous acts.” 
In the culpability model of Alicke (2000), personal control is assumed to vary quantitative-
ly rather than qualitatively, allowing for gradations of personal control. Alicke suggests that de-
sire and foresight are central, reasoning that volitional control is enhanced when consequenc-
es are anticipated and desired, although diminished when consequences are neither foreseen 
nor desired. Alicke further suggests that greater self-control is likely where one has enacted an 
elaborate scheme, or otherwise planned thoroughly, as opposed to having acted impulsively. 
Baumeister and Boden (1998) argue that breakdowns in self-control (or self-regulation) 
processes are at the root of most violent acts. They posit that self-control can be understood 
as the ability to prevent oneself from responding in a certain way or the ability to refrain 
from tendencies that would otherwise occur. Failure of self-control is theorized to have three 
primary causes: (1) when individuals hold confl icting internal standards (e.g., fi nding it dif-
fi cult to act violently in a situation where it is expected, such as war); (2) where there is in-
hibited self-monitoring or self-awareness; and (3) where there is lack of strength to control 
aggressive impulses. The authors report that this third cause is less well understood, being 
302                          MERCADO, SCHOPP, & BORNSTEIN IN AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 10 (2005)
that it is unknown why aggressive impulses at times overcome the capacity for self-regula-
tion. Indeed, this third cause may simply be restating the claim of low self-control, which of 
course, seems not to be very well understood. 
Baumeister and Boden (1998) also discuss the distinction between failure and aban-
donment of self-control, opining that “the notion of irresistible violent impulses seems to 
be a self-serving construction of defense lawyers and of perpetrators wishing for forgive-
ness rather than a psychological fact” (p. 130). They understand most criminal acts to oc-
cur through acquiescence, or a choice to abandon self-control, and cite as support instanc-
es of offenders turning on and off their aggressive actions through rational thought. They 
do not, however, offer explanation of the impairment involved in failure (as opposed to 
abandonment) of self-control. 
Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) suggest that persons typically act during a “moment 
of weakness,” as opposed to being driven by irresistible impulses (p. 13). Furthermore, 
they posit that self-control is a limited resource, breaking down as a result of fatigue, over-
exertion, or stress, although strengthening through the regular practice of impulse control. 
Indeed, it has been argued that self-control operates like a muscle, becoming weaker af-
ter exertion, replenishing with rest, and slowly becoming stronger with repeated exercise 
(Baumeister & Exline, 2000). This discussion of the limits or tendencies of self-control 
would, of course, be more helpful if there existed a clear explanation of the notion of voli-
tional impairment. 
Hare (1993) discusses “poor behavioral controls” as central to psychopathic behavior, 
noting that criminals often have weak inhibitory controls that are overcome with only slight 
provocation (p. 59). Despite their “hair trigger” impulsive responses, however, Hare opines 
that psychopaths are not out of control because they know exactly what they are doing (p. 
60). Hare implies that although psychopaths often choose to “blow their stack” in response 
to situations, they are in complete control while doing so (e.g., rationally deciding to sexual-
ly assault someone in a location where they will not be discovered; p. 60). 
In summary, the psychological literature, similar with legal theory, provides mixed no-
tions of self-control. However, most seem to imply that self-control varies along a quan-
titative dimension, that is, that there are degrees to which actors possess self-control and 
factors that may infl uence self-control. Moreover, while these psychological theorists 
seem to reject the notion of irresistible impulses, they also discuss gradations of self-con-
trol. Considering such gradations, it is not entirely clear why they typically view actors as 
abandoning self-control instead of veritably losing control, which perhaps could occur at 
the utmost gradation. What is clear is that mental health professionals seem to view the 
concept of self-control as very relevant to criminal behavior (e.g., Gottfredson & Hirschi, 
1990; Hare, 1993). Often, however, the notion of self-control, as discussed, seems to over-
lap with the typical qualities of criminal behavior, including impulsivity, risk taking, short 
sightedness, and low self-monitoring. Whether these psychological notions of self-control 
are relevant to the discussion of volitional impairment in the legal context is uncertain. At 
a minimum, they provide insight as to what psychologists view as relevant and, as such, 
are important to the extent that mental health professionals are frequently asked to provide 
testimony. 
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6.4. Psychological practice 
Hall (1985), noting the lack of operational criteria within the various legal tests of insan-
ity, sought to provide evaluation guidelines to apply to forensic evaluations. He notes that 
“massive stress” and “certain organic conditions” may weaken behavioral controls (p. 13). 
Evidence of volitional capacity in his model includes instances of behavioral self-regulation. 
Hall provides an example of “changing the availability of a stimulus,” whereby a person 
gives a weapon to another (fearing loss of self-control), to illustrate the point that self-con-
trol is, in fact, operating (p. 13). Hall also suggests that “doing something else” to prevent an 
expected response may be indicative of volitional capacity (p. 13). Thus, a sex offender who 
distances himself from a potential victim may be changing the availability of a stimulus in 
an exercise of volitional capacity. Similarly, an offender who avoids viewing child pornogra-
phy, as he is familiar with his typical response to it, would be exercising self-control. 
Rogers and Shuman (2000) attempted to translate legal standards into psychological con-
cepts. In operationalizing volitional capacity, as it relates to the “irresistible impulse” test, 
they suggest that the “loss of power” to avoid doing the act addresses the inevitability and 
uncontrollability of the behavior (p. 73). However, there is no clear articulation provided re-
garding the point at which behavior becomes either inevitable or uncontrollable. Moreover, 
this seems to imply that we understand the process, although the defi nition remains ambig-
uous. They also suggest that clinical attention be given to the role of situational variables, 
temporary emotional states, and substance use in evaluating loss of control. Moreover, the 
authors direct attention to the defendant’s attempts to resist or avoid the criminal behavior, 
implying that efforts at resisting impulses may be indicative of volitional impairment. 
Rogers and Shuman (2000) also attempt to address the ALI volitional prong, suggesting 
that the phrase “conformity of conduct” refers to “any marked loss in self-determined purpo-
sive behavior at the time of the offense” (p. 79). Loss of behavioral control is often reported 
to be paralleled by loss of cognitive control, although the authors suggest that there may be 
situations where the defendants have cognitive awareness of their actions, although they lack 
the ability to control their behavior. Unfortunately, they do not specify what the key charac-
teristics of these situations might be. 
Rogers and Shuman (2000) suggest several factors as relevant to the ALI determination 
of volitional impairment. These include the defendant’s perceived options, decision-making 
abilities, the deliberateness of the actions, and the point at which criminal actions become 
“inevitable” (p. 80). They further note that reckless or impulsive behavior, the defendant’s 
self-reported volitional impairment, ritualistic behavior, and ineptness (i.e., bungled criminal 
activity) are not necessarily related to volitional impairment. They also stress that the ability 
of the accused to foresee and thus avoid situations where uncontrollability is likely to occur 
is relevant and must also be considered. 
Webster and Jackson (1997), in offering a clinical perspective of “impulse-driven con-
duct,” provide a sketch of the typical impulsive person. The following characteristics are en-
veloped in fi ve domains: (1) interpersonal dysfunction: manipulative, black/white thinking 
with regard to others, distrustful; (2) lack of plans: avoidance of change, volatile lifestyle; 
(3) distorted self-esteem: low self-awareness, hopelessness, acting rashly to avoid emotion-
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al discomfort; (4) anger and rage: aggression, low frustration tolerance, high explosivity; 
and (5) irresponsibility: entitlement, beliefs that most others act immorally and irresponsibly, 
poor ability to cope with emotional discomfort. It is not clear from the description, however, 
when this impulse-driven conduct is resistible versus irresistible. 
While some authors have attempted to provide guidelines or articulation relevant to vo-
litional impairment, their operationalizations have been less than satisfactory. First, there is 
frequent reference to what may or may not qualify as volitional impairment (e.g., massive 
stress, certain organic conditions, impulsive behavior, and ineptness), although no author 
precisely defi nes the notion of volitional impairment, nor is there even precision or agree-
ment as to which and in what capacity these factors refl ect volitional impairment. Moreover, 
while some description seems to support the idea that we understand the process of how one 
loses control, there is no clear articulation of what this means. Finally, as with the theoretical 
literatures, there seems to be considerable overlap in the notions of impulsive criminal be-
havior and lack of self-control, such that volitional impairment may merely mean reckless or 
otherwise irresponsible behaviors. 
6.5. Empirical research 
On the whole, there has been little scientifi c evidence to show how volition operates, 
leaving the exploration of volition to be mostly theoretical in nature (Pelayo, 1999). Howev-
er, some empirical research has attempted to examine the construct and perceptions of self-
control or how the construct of self-control relates to other variables. 
Arneklev, Grasmick, and Bursik (1999) developed a scale to examine the six self-control 
components (impulsivity, avoidance of diffi cult tasks, risk-taking, tendency to be physical 
rather than mentally contemplative, self-centeredness, and bad temper) of the theory of crime 
of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990). They found support for the theory, as the six dimensions 
did appear to coalesce into a global latent trait, and low self-control was found to be an in-
variant characteristic, remaining stable through time and social situations in their sample of 
683 community members and undergraduates. However, the authors also found that the di-
mension of impulsivity seemed to be the most important dimension of the global construct, 
leaving them to ponder, “Is low self-control, to a large extent, simply impulsivity?” (p. 327). 
Although there appears to be some scientifi c support for the notion of Gottfredson and Hirs-
chi, this construct would not necessarily comport with volitional impairment in the sexual 
predator or insanity context. Without a court-provided articulation, it is impossible to know 
the extent to which these notions intersect. 
Another line of research has examined the relationship between mood and impulse con-
trol. Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister (2001) found some evidence that mood regulation 
may override impulse control in the context of emotional distress, leading them to conclude 
that some people may purposively suspend self-control to escape from bad moods. However, 
the evidence regarding the role of affect and impulse control has been mixed (see, e.g., Tice 
& Ciarocco, 1998). Other research has shown that self-control in one area may undermine 
attempts at self-control in another area (see e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 
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1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). However, in these studies, self-control has typi-
cally been operationalized as the ability to resist one’s desire to do something that is expect-
ed to make one feel good (such as eating a savory snack). Indeed, the majority of self-control 
research has been related to gambling, drug or alcohol use, or eating behaviors. 
Whether the processes that undermine self-control in the above situations are similar with 
those that undermine self-control with respect to sexual assaults or to criminal behavior gen-
erally remains uncertain. However, even if the lack of self-control regarding criminal behavior 
involves processes similar with the lack of self-control in these other domains (gambling, eat-
ing, etc.), there is no apparent reason to think that lack of self-control in this sense constitutes 
the inability to control for the purpose of criminal responsibility or sexual predator commit-
ment. Indeed, this lack of self-control seems to refer to competing desires, such as the choice 
over an immediate strong desire for candy versus a longer term desire to lose weight. It is not 
apparent why acting on one’s current strongest desire should be a legal basis for civil commit-
ment as a sexual predator or for the purpose of exculpation under an insanity defense. 
Burton, Cullen, Evans, Alarid, and Dunaway (1998), in a study fi nding that self-control 
accounted for the gender gap in criminal conduct, operationalized the construct of self-con-
trol of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) on a 12-item scale, including items assessing frustra-
tion tolerance, desire for immediate gratifi cation, patience, preference for risk, and tendency 
to be physical versus mentally contemplative. Finding further support for the hypothesis of 
Gottfredson and Hirschi, their operationalization of low self-control showed a signifi cant re-
lationship with self-reported crime and other self-reported imprudent behaviors in a sample 
of 555 community residents. 
Shively (2001), in a vignette study examining perceived level of self-control among sex-
ual aggressors, found that most participants attributed high levels of self-control to the ag-
gressors across situations. The only variable statistically altering the participants’ ratings of 
perceived control was alcohol consumption. Shively found no support for other contextual 
variables (e.g., amount of foreplay, aggressor’s use of force, and victim’s resistance). Thus, it 
seems that laypersons are unlikely to view aggressive sexual impulses as irresistible, except 
perhaps where substance use is involved. 
As noted, the empirical research examining how volition operates has not been with sexu-
al predators, thus, it is not certain how relevant such research is to this specifi c legal context. 
Once again, there is overlap between the notion of impulsive or antisocial conduct and the 
lack of self-control, as empirical researchers have not only included impulsive or risk-taking 
behaviors in their operationalizations of self-control, but also have found that this impulsiv-
ity seems to refl ect a primary dimension of the self-control construct. Finally, it is apparent 
that although researchers seem to consider self-control as highly relevant to the commission 
of crime, there is rarely an adequate defi nition of what is meant by the term self-control. 
In sum, there does not appear to be a consistent notion of volitional impairment or low 
self-control in the theoretical or empirical literatures, nor in psychological practice guide-
lines. Instead, there is pervasive vagueness and uncertainty, with a clear defi nition rarely giv-
en. Despite this lack of clarity, at least one theme is apparent. Across all domains, there ap-
pears to be divergence with regard to whether one is considering literal or true volitional im-
pairment (irresistible impulse) as opposed to some lesser type of impairment, merely consti-
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tuting an impulse not resisted. Generally, among those adhering to the former standard, there 
seems to be little support for the notion of volitional impairment, where it encompasses any-
thing less than truly unwilled movement. Among those adhering to a more fl exible interpre-
tation of volitional impairment, there is little consensus as to what types of factors support or 
undermine the notion of volitional impairment, with one exception. In discussing the com-
ponents of lack of control, lawmakers, theorists, researchers, or professionals seem to con-
sistently confuse the notion of impulsive conduct with the notion of uncontrollable behav-
ior. Indeed, among those discussing lack of control in this fl exible sense, the exception to 
the general lack of consensus is that there is substantial overlap with impulsive or generally 
reckless behavior. 
This general divergence between literal and fl exible interpretations of volitional impair-
ment is consistent with the discussion of Schopp (1991), including the observation that the 
notion in the fl exible sense is less amenable to counter examples precisely because it is vac-
uous. When looked at carefully, the notion of volitional impairment in the fl exible sense usu-
ally reduces to the claim that a person is not able to control his conduct if he suffers some 
impairment such that it renders him unable to control his conduct. Without clear discussion 
as to the nature of the impairment, however, it is impossible to separate out those offenders 
appropriate for commitment from those appropriate for the criminal justice system. 
7. Conclusion and recommendations 
While the Crane decision requires some evidence of volitional impairment to legitimize 
postsentence sex offender civil commitment schemes, we have little information on exact-
ly what it means to be able to control one’s conduct, other than subjectively defi ned loss of 
control or history of failure to control conduct, which the Supreme Court appeared to rely 
upon in Hendricks. Indeed, the Hendricks record indicated no evidence of literal volition-
al impairment, in that Hendricks seemed effectively able to control his actions through deci-
sion, nor is there evidence to suggest that the court relied upon factors other than Hendricks’ 
repetitive pattern of criminal misconduct. Unfortunately, nowhere in the case does the Court 
precisely articulate what is meant by this notion of volitional impairment. As the idea of vo-
litional control has long been a highly confused concept, not only in the courts but also in the 
realms of psychological and legal literatures, it is curious why the Supreme Court would in-
vite return to this often vaguely defi ned notion through Crane. 
Following Crane, the evaluation of an offender’s volitional capacity will be increasing-
ly important for decision making concerning SVPs. Indeed, mental health professionals will 
likely be asked to provide testimony or report relative to whether an individual is able to 
control his or her behavior. Unfortunately, clinicians have no meaningful understanding of 
the mental components underlying individual control. Legal precedent, theoretical literatures, 
empirical research, and practice guidelines all lack clear operationalizations or conceptions of 
the criteria relevant to volitional impairment. Instead, there is pervasive ambiguity and uncer-
tainty, with frequent overlap between the notions of impulsive behavior and low self-control. 
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This ambiguity in the meaning of volitional impairment may raise a number of ethical 
concerns. Section 2.04 of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (APA, 
2002) mandates that professional judgments be based upon “established scientifi c and profes-
sional knowledge.” Similarly, Section III.A of the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychol-
ogists (Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 1991) advises that “fo-
rensic psychologists provide services only in areas of psychology in which they have special-
ized knowledge, skill, experience, and education.” Because there is a lack of meaning with re-
gard to the notion of volitional impairment, there is, of course, no generally accepted method-
ology for evaluating loss of control and/or making such judgments. Indeed, the use of typical 
assessment techniques would likely be inappropriate under Section 9.02 of the APA princi-
ples, given that no techniques have been developed for such application. Thus, a psychologist 
who provides testimony or report might be practicing out of the bounds of his or her compe-
tence if he or she rendered a judgment about the presence (or absence) of such impairment ab-
sent some generally accepted defi nition of the notion and well-conceived manner in which to 
measure such a notion. Additionally, the principle of nonmalefi cience (“do no harm”) applies. 
Undoubtedly, a psychologist who provides testimony or report about a particular defendant’s 
ability to control behavior has a serious risk of causing harm (i.e., indefi nite commitment as 
a SVP) where such testimony is not based upon legitimate expertise on the specifi c matters 
at issue (see Section III.B of the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists). Given the 
stakes of indefi nite commitment, psychologists have an ethical obligation to practice within 
the scope of their competence and acknowledge the limits of the profession. 
With regard to court-solicited testimony or report, clinicians could certainly describe 
symptom patterns and client characteristics but would be unable to offer information distinc-
tively relevant to volitional capacity, as the construct’s defi nition remains ambiguous. In con-
sideration of this persistent ambiguity, mental health professionals should limit their testimo-
ny to descriptive explanation of behavior, while the courts likewise need to examine careful-
ly the parameters of expert psychological testimony regarding volitional impairment, to in-
sure that such testimony meets applicable evidentiary standards. 
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